TOP SECRET 25X1 CORONA/ARGON WORKING PAPER Controls NRO REVIEW COMPLETED 16 September 1963 Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance MEMORANDUM FOR: Needs for KH Coverage through 1964 SUBJECT: Attached is a paper to be added to the agenda for the meeting of 19 September. It is a draft prepared by the Chairman in pursuance of COMOR-M-194, para 2. 25X1 ames U. Reber Chairman Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance Attachments: Subject paper and Tabs A-D Copies 2, 3. State TCO 25X1 DIA DIA TCO 7.8 OACSI TCO 9, 10 ONI TCO 11, 12 AFNIN TCO 13, 14 NSA TCO 15, 16 NRO TCO NGA Review Completed

CORONA/ARGON

25X1

TOP SECRET CORONA/ARGON

16 September 1963

WORKING PAPER

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT:

Needs for KH-4 Coverage

through 1964

- 1. The COMOR has conducted a review of the amount of satellite photography recently acquired and attempted to project on the basis of past experience the likelihood of successes in the future and the quantitative as well as qualitative effects of such success on the intelligence community's exploitation and research processes. In this review, COMOR has excluded consideration of the KH-6 and KH-7 because the missions to date have been essentially R&D in nature. In addition, ARGON has been excluded since its purposes are not principally the collection of intelligence information but rather information for specific geodetic and mapping programs.
- 2. The COMOR has reviewed recent history on KH coverage. It notes first of all that, after review of a schedule submitted by NRO on 24 January, it requested revision of the NRO 1963 schedule to insure one J in May and June, 2 in July, 1 in August, 2 in September, and 1 in each of the 3 remaining months of the year. This scheduling became the official USIB recommendation in USIB-D-41, 14/7 (COMOR-D-48/2)

TOP SECRET CORONA/ARGON

Controls

of 11 February 1963. Since February there has been slippage in the schedule. In July, Dr. McMillan submitted a revised schedule which was confirmed on 18 July by USIB-D-41.15/14 (COMOR-D-48/42) of 18 July 1963. This schedule called for the first J to be fired on 29 July, the second on 30 August, the third on 17 September, the fourth on 27 September, the fifth on 15 October, and the sixth on 24 October. The seventh and eighth J packages were scheduled for November and December. There has been further slippage in the program sincs that time. The first J was fired on 24 August and produced only half the photography expected because of malfunction; the second and third are due to go on 14 and 27 September, respectively; the fourth, on 15 October; the fifth and sixth on 11 and 14 November; and the seventh on 14 December. The firing of 2 Js in September is, of course, in accordance with the original plan as is the firing of one in October and one in December. The The principal anomoly is that the 2 Js originally scheduled for the good weather month of September have now slipped to November. (The 2 now scheduled for September were, of course, originally slated to go in July.)

3. The attached Tabs A, B, and C summarize the success we have had since June 1961 (a period of 2 1/4 years) in obtaining

T	0	P	S	E	C	R	E	T	
C	O	R	ON	Α	I A	R	G	O)	N

Controls

coverage of the critical targets on the following major target categories ICBM complexes and missile R&D installations, missile production facilities, submarine bases, anti-ballistic missile sites, long-range airfields, nuclear energy facilities, and biological/chemical warfare facilities. These target categories will remain, for the most part, our major concern. If our launches are pointed toward coverage of these installations, we will almost certainly satisfy a very great number of our secondary target concerns and we are quite likely, through the manner in which the photographic capability is programmed, to achieve acquisttion of the greater portion of the Soviet land mass. Our long-range launch schedule should be based on the premise that we need quarterly coverage at a minimum, of at least 50% of the targets in each category (which are the subject of the 3 tabs) and coverage of the whole of the Sov Bloc once a year.*

4. We must take into account the scheduling and slippage which is outlined in the first 2 paragraphs of this paper (and which, by the way, we must assume will in some degree continue as evidenced


^{*}At Tab D is a tabulation of successful missions flown since August 1960 showing the unique area coverage of the Soviet rail net as obtained by each mission.

TOP SECRET CORONA/ARGON

by the fact that within a week the J 1002 slipped from 14 to 21 September) and that what is scheduled cannot be definitely anticipated to be successful.

We must not forget the dire straits of the spring of 1963.

- 5. Our reasoning for the coming year of 1964 then suggests that we have a mirkmum of 12 MURAL packages (or 9 Js with 20 or more days in Zombie) actually recovered with reasonable performance in terms of photography. This may require having a standby capability to insinuate in the event of failure.
- 6. For the remainder of 1963, it is proposed that the schedule not be changed for the J 1002 and 1003 scheduled for 21 and 22 September respectively nor probably for 1004 scheduled for 10 October. However, on 2 October the Board should look at the performance of 1002 and 1003. It may then wish to advise if possible allowing 1004 to slip to later in October or even move to November to take the place of either or both 1005 and 1006 now scheduled for 11 and 14 November respectively. If all goes well, it could be that 2 of the now scheduled missions for the remainder of 1963 could be cancelled and used in 1964.



Approved For Release 2008/05/08 : CIA-RDP92B01090R002700030112-1

Tab D

25X1

TOP SECRET

D R A F

Percentage of Unique Coverage of Soviet Bloc Rail Net Obtained by TALENT/ KEYNOLE Missions (Early Coverage Superceded by Later Missions)

Mission and	Date	Percentage Added	Total Fercentage	
9009	Aug 1960	.03	A\$7.03	
9013	Dec 1960	.06	.09	
9017	Jun 1961	.45	.54	
9019	Jul 1961	.38	.92	
9023	Aug 1961	.26	1.18	
9022	5 ęp 1961	0	1.18	
9025	Oct 1961	0	1.18	
9028	Nov 1961	.09	1.27	
9029	Dec 1961	. 62	1.89	
9031	Mar 1962	•77	2.66	
9032	Apr 1962	2.02	4.68	
9035	Jun 1962	1.73	6.41	
9037	Jun 1962	.62	7.23	
9038	Jul 1962	3.50	10.73	
9039	Jul 1952	.28	11.01	

Group 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET

TAB DONT

	*	·	
Mission	and Date	Percentage Added	Total Percent
9040	Jul 1962	2.61	13.62
9041	Aug 1962	1.59	15.21
90hh	Aug 1952	4.70	19.91
9043	Sep 1952	.63	20.54
9045	0et 1962	3.50	24.04
9047	Nov 1962	10.93	34.97
8406	110v 1962	3.07	<u> 3</u> 8.04
9050	Dec 1962	6.52	44.56
9053	Apr 1953	9.82	<i>5</i> 4.38
9054	Jun 1953	13.25	67.63
9056	Jun 2063	28,65	96 . 28
***.		1	•

-2-

TOP SECRET

25<u>X</u>1

TOP SECRET Controls CORONA/ARGON

Copies

- 1 DCI TCO for USIB/S
- 18 TSO CIA
- 19-21 Asst/OPS(NPIC)
 - 22 LS/PID(NPIC)
 - 23 DDI TCO
- 24,25 CGS
- 26, 27 CIA COMOR Member
 - 28 CGS/ReqBr/ReconGrp
 - 29 Ch/COMOR WkgGrp
 - 30 AD/SI
 - 31 DDP TCO
 - 32 DDS&T TCO
 - 33 AD/OSA
 - 34 FA/OSA
 - 35 ID/OSA
 - 36 SS/OSA
 - 37 SAL/OSA
- 17.38 49 SA/DDS&T

6

25X1

CORONA /ARGON TOP SECRET

Controls